The lack of contact of the left wheels on the ground, which the Weight of Wheel sensor deployment depends on, as in both wheels being grounded, which the auto-speed brakes/thrust reversers depend on, worsened the whole situation as the crew seems to be unaware why they weren't losing speed after they'd 'landed'.
Every single thing they could do wrong at, they did.
> Every single thing they could do wrong at, they did.
There are just too many ways to screw up for that ever to be the case.
For instance, they could also have been lined up to land on something other than the runway they were cleared to land on -- see Air Canada Flight 759, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Canada_Flight_759, which came within 14 feet of colliding with an aircraft on the taxiway they mistook for the runway..
I would expect, that if they tried to deploy thrust reversers, that event would have been included in this summary. If such an assumption is safe, then the implication is that they didn't even try to deploy reverse thrust which is insane.
Similarly, it isn't specified anywhere, but it took TEN FULL SECONDS of contact with the runway between first wheel down and last wheel down. Why didn't spoilers deploy and bring down the third wheel way faster than that? Do spoilers require all three wheels already down? Why, this is exactly what they are for!
There was also 7 seconds between first wheel touchdown and first application of brakes. That would seem to mean they were confused and autobrakes didn't function, but then the third wheel comes down, which should have let autobrakes and thrust reversers deploy, yet the aircraft only lost 14 knots in the 4 seconds between that event and the throttles being moved to go around. That is consistent with only the existing braking effort, which expended a similar speed in the previous 4 seconds. Brake performance may have been reduced by a slick runway maybe.
15 full seconds between first wheel touchdown and an actual decision to go around being executed. 3000 feet is a rather significant portion of any runway.
https://youtu.be/Dcyup4xVQuM This was discussed during the initial reporting. While the GPS jamming is an important technical issue, the broader lesson may be pilot preparedness for degraded-navigation scenarios. This accident also highlights the ongoing debate over whether accumulating flight hours is adequately complemented by realistic defensive training for GPS-denied and other abnormal operations.
One technical point that initially puzzled me was why Spidertrax appeared to retain GPS coordinates while the FMS did not.
My understanding is that certified FMS GPS receivers use Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) and other integrity checks. During GPS jamming, the increased noise and degraded signal quality can cause the receiver to determine that it can no longer guarantee a reliable navigation solution, resulting in a NAV FAIL or RAIM warning.
A tracking device such as Spidertrax, on the other hand being a glorified telematics grade positioning device, is designed for best-effort position reporting rather than certified navigation, so it may continue outputting an estimated position using noisy GNSS data and motion filtering, even when that solution is no longer suitable for primary aircraft navigation.
Got to give you kudos for the Accessibility enablement though - while some of it is baked-in support, it’s worth appreciating your work in whittling down whatever else can be supported.
I'm curious if you used a particular tool for this comparison or a LLM. I ask because (layered irony) I'm making a general tool for multi-dimensional item comparisons, using Claude to build the tool (but not the comparisons, not that I mind).
Khosla and Nilekani are to blame for this a lot more than anyone else. They got India to steamroll the iris scan in the AADHAR enrollment process and now that is used to justify every other expansion.
Every single thing they could do wrong at, they did.
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