It always amuses me when I hear people complaining about the privacy issues with Flock cameras (on public roads) while wearing an Apple Watch or carrying an iPhone in their pocket everywhere they go.
which part amuses you? the one where the former uploads all your data to the cloud only to be mismanaged and surveilled or the where the latter doesn't?
They didn't pick the bad vendor, the herd did. They all go to the same conferences, attend the same vendor lunches and buy the same garbage. And today, most of the IT managers are not technical at all. They have art degrees and have never been technology practitioners.
Literally anyone off the street can be a "decision maker" in technology today. Just buy what everyone else is buying and collect a huge paycheck while working remote. People who understand tech and sort of know what they are doing, are not included.
No ... THEY very much did. In fact the whole idea of their job is that they are responsible for the outcomes. Seriously. Listen to their speeches. That gets repeated and repeated and repeated, again and again and again.
Of course, if insurance companies were rapidly held to account by courts, a core function of the courts if there ever was one, there would be no problem here.
Which is probably why most governments are defunding the courts.
I work with a lot of great engineers with similar behavior. Their arguments are not personal, although they seem to be. They are just very passionate and care deeply about certain things (in this case operating systems security).
If you can get past the aggressive/offensive language they use and develop a relationship with them, they can be reasonable and helpful. That's been my experience.
Alan M. Turing thought about criteria to settle the question of whether Machines Can Think, a question of which we now know that it is about as relevant as the question of whether Submarines Can Swim
Which has often been paraphrased as
The question of whether machines can think is about as relevant as the question of whether submarines can swim.
Some might disagree with the relevance but it's a cute analogy.
The whole essay [1] is actually somewhat relevant to modern LLM use for other reasons. He spends a lot of time lamenting the industry's obsession with "user friendly" interfaces which obscure the underlying complexity of the problem at hand.
I think this quote is often misunderstood. It isn't really about machines, but about English definition of swimming (and thinking): a living creature moving in water. That makes debating whether submarines can swim rather pointless. You can replace it by "can airplanes fly?" and the meaning changes because we colloquially say that yes, airplanes fly. In Russian, for example, submarines definitely swim (I believe Dijkstra himself mentioned it at some point). I personally believe that defining thinking as something only humans are capable of is rather narrow.
It's embedded in an explanation as to why computer science at the time seemed to have such a strong local character, despite all the homogenizing influences. He partly puts blames on the founders of the field who were "confusing", perusing weird questions like whether computers could think. It doesn't seem strongly tied to the rest of the essay. The rest of the essay is mostly about the overselling of user-friendly computation and how it can corrupt computer science (which, as I said, also seems relevant to the recent AI craze).
Of course his glib dismissal doesn't make the question wrong, it's just a fun quote for those who already believe that human thought could (eventually) mimicked by a machine.
I don't think the original context particularly matters: the quote now has a life of its own. A rock was formed to satisfy the laws of thermodynamics that demanded an efflux of heat, but I can still use it to smash a window.
How are you making this confident of a claim? Do you have insight into how consciousness is a thing, allowing you to definitely say it doesn't exist in this case?
In living beings, consciousness is embodied and can not be reproduced by discrete steps. You can not sit down with pen and paper, and reproduce by hand exactly what is going on inside someone’s brain.
But you could replicate exactly the calculations happening as a LLM computes the next token. Would that be conscious? Where would that consciousness reside?
My view is that LLMs are designed and trained to autocomplete narratives, and that as part of that process they develop an emergent narrative about themselves. Whatever personality traits they exhibit is part of that narrative. Perhaps this is not that different from how humans learn to move in social contexts, but it is not consciousness as it happens in living beings.
>> In living beings, consciousness is embodied and can not be reproduced by discrete steps.
Why not, at least in principle? Wouldn’t an exact map of a brain’s neural structure and its electromagnetic and chemical state, combined with inputs mirroring the senses, be able to be automated to produce a digital analog of human thought.
The model is impractical and couldn’t be reproduced today, yes. But what, exactly, is missing?
People have thought they were nearly complete at least for 500 years, probably longer.
When you choose a specific model to represent the brain you are asserting you’ve accounted for everything that generates consciousness (=the lights are on, experiences qualia). This means you’ve solved the hard problem. The hard problem is debated constantly though.
In my view there is absolutely no reason to think a description of reality can be equal to reality. There are probably (in my view that is) aspects of reality, like first person internal experience, that fundamentally can not be described with third party linguistic / symbolic / representational devices.
How is this "common sense"? The question of what consciousness is, what it emerges from, etc. literally have no proved answer at the moment.
Take this statement: "consciousness emerges from sufficient complexity in any system". Neither you or I can prove it right or wrong, but we can both make an assumption that if it was right, then there would be a way for an LLM to be conscious.
I'm not arguing that they are, I'm saying being this confident that they are not is the exact same as being confident that they are.
I don't think that argument holds water, because the scope of what can be reasonably approximated by matrix multiplication is extremely broad (especially when the matrix multiplication is also paired with a source of randomness).
Not sure about "nonsensical calculation", but our brains perform computation (read: they transform information). In fact, that is what the brains are for (see: biology 101). As for mathematics, I am with Galileo: it is the language of the universe. Of course, we "invented" its silly glyphs and the like, but those are secondary. My 2 cents.
Who exactly are these people confidently claiming that stones possess consciousness you are talking about?
I've read a number of panpsychist publications, yet I have yet to encounter an author who asserts with certainty that stones are conscious exactly in the same way human beings are.
The more common panpsychist interpretation, that everything exists on a spectrum of consciousness, with stones at the low end and humans at the high end, seems like a fairly reasonable ontological hypothesis to me.
A lot of answers to this question so it depends which layer you are talking about.
Functionally,I'd say a key difference is that it's probably easier to perform general computation with a computer than to achieve the same goal using a stone.
If the computer is functional, powered, and connected to some some kind of interface allowing you to use it (e.g. network, touchscreen, desktop setup, etc.), then sure you can use it to perform general computation. But if its unpowered, is there any real difference between a stone and a computer in a debate about consciousness?
So because you eventually die, it means that you were never alive?
The weights of an llm obviously don't have consciousness. It's the process that potentially has it.
> So because you eventually die, it means that you were never alive?
I said nothing of the kind. I can only assume your question in response to my comments mean you think a powered computer is alive. I'll challenge that on the basis that a computer can generally maintain its state without power just fine. Shut it down, unplug it. Wait a day, a year, a decade and plug it back in. Assuming the hardware didn't degrade to the point of failure you can turn it on again and it will be in the same state you left it in before you unplugged it. Is it alive while its unplugged? Or is it simply not alive whether its plugged in or not?
The philosophical zombie does not satisfy occams razor because it asserts an unmeasurable property that has no effect on the outcome.
If it acts like it has consciousness, then assuming it to have consciousness is more scientifically rigorous, than assuming for it not to have consciousness, because the former requires one less variable.
When John Searle first published his so-called "Chinese Room" argument (https://web-archive.southampton.ac.uk/cogprints.org/7150/1/1...) he included his responses to several counter-arguments that he had been presented with in prior discussions: the systems reply, the robot reply and so forth. Interestingly (as it turns out) no-one seems to have argued that this was a task that could be completed without any understanding, but now that AI technology has reached the point of being able to implement the Chinese Room, it has become the fallback position of those who insist that true AI is impossible!
This is not an argument for true AI being possible, let alone already achieved; it is a warning about depending on arguments from incredulity, which are particularly susceptible to future developments.
The problem with philosophy is that someone can present an argument that is pretty dumb, everyone can point out it's dumb, people can show evidence that it's dumb, reason through how dumb it is, and publish articles about the many different ways in which it's dumb, and still it gets trotted out as if it counts as evidence for some argument. Searle's Room was debunked immediately upon being suggested: the "Systems Reply" is the debunking. His response was: "but if you take all the knowledge out of the system and put it in the person, then the person still doesn't understand Chinese!" Which is obviously false and immediately collapses his entire argument down to nothing. He starts from the premise "this person doesn't understand Chinese; he is just following instructions that are written down for him" and then immediately rejects his own premise and say "actually he does understand all of Chinese and everything he's doing, but he still doesn't, you know, understand it, see?" It's completely embarrassing.
Searle's Rooms is a fully rejected and rebutted argument, and Philosophy will never be (and never has been) a serious discipline until it figures out how to actually let go of failed arguments.
Huh? How does the person having all the instruction books memorized and whatnot imply that the person understands Chinese? Memorizing instructions to the point that one can mentally follow them doesn’t imply understanding why they work. If the person doesn’t understand the correspondence between the Chinese written words and things in the external world, then surely they don’t understand Chinese in the sense we generally mean when we talk about whether a person understands Chinese. (I think this is related to the robot reply?)
That’s not to say that I think the Chinese Room Argument is convincing. I don’t think it is. Or, I guess it might demonstrate something, but not what it aims to show.
I would argue that if, say, the person who has memorized this program and mentally executes it, and if this program also includes actuating some levers to control a mech or something, and the program (running via the person mentally going through the instructions by rote) takes actions to pursue some goals (e.g. purchasing some wood by conversing in Chinese and building a tower with that wood), while the person on whom the program is running wouldn’t know how to order a cheeseburger in Chinese,
Then, the program running in that person’s head might well understand Chinese even though the person doesn’t. (Whether or not the program actually understands Chinese, I think probably depends on the specific of the program in ways that I don’t think anyone knows. I don’t expect that any program that would understand could be small enough that a human person could memorize it and execute it by rote in this way, but this is a thought experiment and such issues can be disregarded I think.)
The point is that Searle's entire exercise is to show that there can be execution without understanding, and he does this by creating an agent whose only purpose is blind execution of rules. Since this agent doesn't have the understanding, there must be no understanding.
Critics immediately point out: yes, there clearly is still understanding, it's just in the system itself -- the program. The fact that the person does not have the understanding doesn't mean the understanding is gone.
His response to this is: but what if the system was the person's brain!?
Okay, so either it doesn't address the criticism at all (there is still a system of rules that contains the understanding; who cares whether that system is internal or external to the person's brain?) or it completely destroys the original premise of the argument, which is that the understanding is not in the person! You can't put the understanding back in the human agent and still claim the human doesn't understand what they're doing! His entire argument relies on the fact that the human agent obviously doesn't understand Chinese, and then says, actually, their brain contains everything it needs to know to have completely fluent conversations in Chinese. So the person does understand Chinese!
> How does the person having all the instruction books memorized and whatnot imply that the person understands Chinese?
How does a person's brain containing all the facts, information, and skills that it needs to have a fluent conversation in Chinese imply that the person understands Chinese? How does it not!?
>How does a person's brain containing all the facts, information, and skills that it needs to have a fluent conversation in Chinese imply that the person understands Chinese? How does it not!?
Notice that the man while having memorized the rulebook can't convey any fact of his childhood in Chinese. He can only convey facts encoded in the rulebook, perhaps of a hypothetical childhood. The point is there are different ways information is stored in the brain; one way is through rote memory, the other is something like semantic memory. The rulebook encoded as rote memory doesn't endow his semantic memory contact with the meaning of the symbols. Hence the man doesn't understand Chinese.
This doesn't render the Chinese argument successful. The system's reply still stands when understood properly. I like to call it the virtual mind objection. Physically executing the rules in the rulebook just instantiates a virtual mind. Whether the man is reading the rules from the book or just pulling them from memory is irrelevant.
Because they can’t use Chinese to speak about things they encounter in the world?
Like, someone asks them in Chinese whether they are hungry and want some food, and they answer based on the program, not based on whether they are actually hungry, because they don’t understand the words in a way that lets them use them as a person who understood Chinese would.
Again, I don’t mean to say that in such a situation that there is no understanding of Chinese happening in their head, only that this doesn’t constitute that person understanding Chinese.
It seems to me very strange to want to say that the person with the simulation in their head understands Chinese. They can’t do the things that understanding Chinese lets people do.
Perhaps the program the person has running in their head is even a person, a moral patient and a moral agent, and one who understands Chinese. But the person who is running (by rote) the program, doesn’t thereby understand Chinese. They may “contain understanding of Chinese”. The understanding is definitely happening in their brain. But they don’t understand Chinese.
> How does a person's brain containing all the facts, information, and skills that it needs to have a fluent conversation in Chinese.
They don't, they have simply memorised a translation function which takes Chinese as input and returns Chinese as output. They don't have facts or information about the Chinese language - they don't even need to know what language they are speaking!
When the person reads 汉堡包, do they understand what that is?
Assuming you don't speak Mandarin, do you understand that word? If not, how could you claim to understand Mandarin? Even if you could use the translation function to speak it, you still don't understand it. Remember that the translation function is Mandarin -> Mandarin, so if you don't understand Mandarin you cannot use it to gain an understanding of the word.
The person who memorized the book doesn’t understand Chinese. In fact they don’t even understand that Chinese isn’t a language. Searle’s response stands.
So you could put this person in a room with a bunch of native Chinese speakers, and he could hold conversations fluently with all of them. Yet you claim he doesn't understand Chinese? How can you possibly defend that? This is very close to "zombie theory" -- everyone else is an automaton except you. Nobody else has real thoughts. That obviously fluent Chinese speaker doesn't really understand Chinese.
If the person was told in Chinese to jump in the air, would they be able to follow that instruction? If they actually understood Chinese they would. But since they don’t and they’re just mechanically translating symbols without actually understanding the language conceptually they would not know to jump.
> What's stopping the book from containing that information?
Because in the thought experiment, the translation function (which is what you mean by the book) is f(Chinese) -> Chinese. If you don't have knowledge of Chinese, it won't help you.
We can also play a little game. I’ve invented a language called Kejdoke.
Me: Jeheixis ownc j’Lm hys bjækf¿
You: Kloften¡’by
You should be able to tell me what this exchange was about. Since any reasonable definition of understanding for a language would be to do this, and you have the same knowledge of Kejdoke as the person in the thought experiment has about Chinese. If you can't tell me what this exchange was about, the person in the thought experiment could not understand either.
This just alters the thought experiment. What the thought experiment offers is a book of opaque rules, just instructions on how to transform symbols into more symbols without any concern for their meaning. What you're offering is a translation dictionary, what does it mean when one encounters X symbol. You're giving him a book on learning Chinese.
It only takes a finite number of rules to generate a mapping between unbounded strings of finite symbols. The brain doesn't contain an infinite amount of information after all.
You've taken the understanding back out of the person's brain again. Remember, the whole experiment is to try to claim that there is no understanding, anywhere. Yes, I actually think Google Translate basically "understands" Chinese, and any human-relational part that it doesn't fully "understand" it is understood by the human using it. The human plus Google Translate contain a full understanding of Chinese (up to the fidelity of Google Translate).
Not a great argument. You're describing what LLMs are trained to do, not necessarily every capability or property produced by that training. We do not know what conditions are sufficient for consciousness. Any statements saying it's not possible for consciousness to emerge (or that it hasn't already) in such a system is no more established than claiming that it has
It's becoming increasingly head-in-the-sand to make statements like this. Not that I'm saying LLMs are conscious. But to completely ignore the possibility of emergent properties in systems this complex is kind of simple.
i think there's plenty of evidence of emergent behavior in llms already. This is the driving factor for just more parameters and bigger training sets, "If we just make it bigger maybe more unexpected behaviors will emerge".
They can have empathy too. Meaning, you can describe a circumstance with many parties involved, with different motivations and conflicting goals -- and it will tell you how these humans would likely feel about each other and the situation at hand.
They can provide text which contains thoughts, reasoning, and empathy, but is that evidence of them having thoughts, reasoning, or empathy?
To paraphrase the Chinese room argument:
Put me in a room with infinite time, paper, pencils, filing cabinets, and give me an English language list of instructions for doing all the neural-net calculations required to run an LLM. Slide your prompt under the door, and, after doing all the calculations, I will slide the next word out, and so I will repeat until the response is done.
In this thought experiment, I'm just following the instructions. So, in this case, what is doing the "thinking" or "reasoning" or "empathy" here?
The inputs going through the model. That act is what is doing the thinking and reasoning and empathizing. Same as when your brain feeds your sensory inputs through its neural network.
Your brain is just a big set of weights/neurons organized into layers that do back and forward propagation, turns out. You are just statistics surrounded by flesh and bones.
A sociopath can also pantomime empathy for their own selfish reasons simply by observing how others behave in similar situations, while feeling nothing special at all.
The author is anthropomorphizing a language-tamagotchi.
LLMs can reason, reasoning is logic, and as you said yourself it is derived from what humans belief is reasonable. However, there is more to the structure of language, the way mathematics is also a language that ultimately describes the universe.
Depends on the actual scan. A head CT can be as little as one sievert while a full blown angiogramm can be more than ten sievert. A pilot can accrue 40k flight hours over his career. If 90% of that is at cruising altitude (meaning 3-6 microsievert/hour), that would be 100-200 mSv in total. That would be equivalent to more than a hundred head CTs or a dozen angios. If you need that many CTs, your lifetime cancer risk is probably your smallest concern. But you still wouldn't expose any normal human to that level of radiation.
For general comparison astronauts are exposed to approximately 72 millisieverts (mSv) while on six-month-duration missions to the International Space Station (ISS).
According to linear no-threshold model (LNT model) the incidence of cancers due to ionizing radiation can be modeled as increasing linearly with effective dose at a rate of 5.5% per sievert, so a flight crew member receiving 200 mSv lifetime dose should have 1.1 % higher lifetime chance of cancer then general population. LNT is quite good model for high doses, but there is much less confidence for LNT at low doses, there both studies which confirm LNT at low doses and reject LNT at low doses.
For the overall US population risk of developing any cancer is 39.9% for men, 39.0 % for women.
> In terms of absolute risk, about 6.9% of flight attendant deaths were from these cancers — roughly 1 in 14. Among pilots, it was 6.7%. For the general working population, it was 5%, said the study’s first author, Dr. Vishal Patel of Harvard Medical School.
So it looks like LNT is maybe a bit too optimistic at low doses, because (with the caveat I'm not entirely sure what precisely these percentages mean) the reported excesses are 1.9 and 1.7 percentage points.
Without access to the study and study data we don't know what was measured and how it was calculated, because the value for absolute risk in general working population, the value 5%, is very different from other cancer death studies.
According the The American Cancer Society the risk of dying from any cancer is 17.2% for males, 16% for females for the overall US population.
Cosmic radiation is mainly protons and heavier nuclei. It's called radiation for legacy reasons, but it's a different beast from Earth's medical CT scans and X-rays which are manly photons.
Cosmic radiation hitting planes is also not the original cosmic protons and He nucleus etc, but secondary N and O nucleus hit by Cosmic particles creating a shower of neutrons, secondary and gamma protons, muons, pions, nuclear fragments... There's also a high dose of photons from these collisions, but proportionally it can be 500x less photons than a CT scan for a 10h USA-Europe flight.
What's biologically significant for air crew are these secondary protons and neutrons, which punch above their weight in damage interactions, they are not comparable to X-rays in Sieve alone.
Wonderful work by Mr. XKCD (Randall Munroe).
This was published in 2011 when there was "some" misinformation in the U.S. press about the Fukushima nuclear accident.
Based on this chart some proposed to use "bananas" as unit of radition (equivalent to 0.1 uSv).
So (from this chart) one flight from New York to LA exposes you to 400 bananas worth of radiation.
I don't object to Flock cameras or any other public cameras. But if I did, I would write to my congress person rather than commit a crime and destroy someone's property.
There is a juggernaut of surveillance consuming everything in its path, where laws are skirted to install surveillance instruments and due process might as well not exist. And you're talking about "protecting property" and pulling out your little pen and paper to tell your congressperson "i'd like you to try this instead, please"
I'm sorry, no. You don't necessarily have to be the one taking action in the streets, by all means write your letter, but please don't criticize others and pretend that your approach will get you any further than other peoples approach
It was like this in the face of some of the BLM protests. A notable group of people were saying:
> It's terrible that an innocent black man died. But this property destruction has to stop!
when, in reality, the perspective should be much more:
"It's terrible that there is this property destruction. But these innocent deaths have to stop!"
Hyperbole, some may some reading this, "We're talking about license plate readers[1], not people being shot or killed", but let's be real, there's very much a non-zero risk of that happening as a result of Flock-spawned encounters (and to be even more real, the culture from the top, as espoused very directly by its CEO is that false positives are a better outcome, and should be how the system works, rather than a false negative, because, ugh, "false negatives don't advance our mission to a world without crime, thanks to Flock").
[1] And they do far more than recognize license plates.
This is a justification for any kind of vigilanteism. Is this also what you will tell armed righties who decide to round up illegal immigrants and shuttle them across the border to Mexico because the government is ignoring their concerns or is breaking the law because the government ignores you only reserved for your pet causes?
That is not inconsistent with a belief that violence against a person is worse than violence against property. It is odd to compare kidnapping a person with destroying their home security cameras.
Democracy operates at multiple levels. You’ll notice that armed right wingers kidnapping people suspected of being undocumented is a problem confined to the government itself. There’s a reason for that. No-one really cares about immigrants, outside of performative politics, enough to take that personal risk. If they did, we’d find out what society’s reaction is. People are unlikely to look on that as favorably as they do on petty vandalism against an undemocratic rollout of a surveillance network.
> On Jan. 20, just three days after Cade’s aid camp visit near Sasabe, another group assembled on a ridge overlooking the Rio Grande in Texas and stood over five seated migrants. Some of those standing were armed with long guns or pistols and one wore tactical gear; they questioned the migrants, all young men or boys, while filming them.
But structurally, doing vigilante immigration enforcement is more difficult than doing vigilante destruction of property. Destroying a security camera takes one person doing one action one time; physically restraining a human being who doesn't want to be restrained and physically transporting them to the US border is a complex logistical operation that you really need the resources of a state-run bureaucracy in order to do. A vigilante group can't replicate it, unless it's so large and well-organized itself that it's a de-facto rival state to the legitimate US government, and this simply doesn't exist in the United States at this time.
> I would write to my congress person rather than commit a crime and destroy someone's property.
Your congressman is having a nice steak dinner with representatives of the company while some poor staffer pastes the generic response in the letter sent back to you.
People cite Flock as an example of this. Yet the same people walk around with iPhones and Android devices that can record conversations (who talks to whom at what times and for how long), know our exact locations and log everything we do online.
If I had told you 30 years ago that we are going to build a surveillance network and make the people we are tracking pay for it all you would have laughed me out of the room. But that is what we have built. The modern Smart Phone.
Now we use our iPhones to complain about cameras on public roads as if they are watching us.
Very flawed argument, anyone can go for a walk without their phone on them and have a conversation, nobody would ask them why they don't have their phone on them.
Ostensibly they need a warrant to get that data from Apple/Google whereas they have a direct line to Flock data cause that's how that relationship works
Go is good enough for many tasks. Google wrote that as a replacement for C++ too. I guess Carbon is intended to be more for systems programming? Go had that intent initially, but soon realized that's not a good fit.
We have protections for smart phones which limit when a police department can search for them. Further, it's harder for police departments to get at the contents of a phone.
Flock cameras provide no barrier for police departments to use them (hence the police using them to track their exes). It provides cops with the ability to target and ruin the day of someone they don't like for whatever reason they like.
But further, these cameras are coordinated and the system is designed for easy access of the data for the entire network. Your cellphone and other's cellphones only track them. There is no easy access network that anyone could use (except for maybe apple/google) and the main information they'd get is location data, not footage. And critically, I can turn my cell phone off.
It gets further messed up in that flock can grant access to their surveillance system to private individuals, where there is absolutely no legal barrier to what they can look up. That means if they want to start building advertising profiles, make hiring decisions, or just want to stalk their exes, they can.
I don't really have a problem with a CCTV system. I have a problem with a giant network of cameras recording everything which is built for easy access and tracking of individuals.
Cellphones aren't that. But to the extent they could become that, I oppose that as well.
> In 2026, the Supreme Court limited the application of the doctrine to digital location data as well. Chatrie v. United States held that law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment search when it compels Google to provide a user's historical location information, even though the data is held by a third-party techonology company.
That's not a refute. As I said, flock is providing no barrier. It's the responsibility of the cops to not use the system illegally.
And the police don't really care [1]. You could almost certainly do that audit nationwide and find huge portions of the police force breaking the law routinely.
That said, I'd certainly support legislation which forced these surveillance systems to require any who wants to use the system to present a search warrant. And to enforce the parameters of that warrant and not allow for searches exceeding it. But I imagine flock wouldn't like that. After all, their entire business model is providing fast and broad searches without requiring a warrant.
In theory, the phone camera (and microphone) are not supposed to be on 24/7 and sending that info to a 3rd party. Whether that can be known for sure is probably known only to the hardware/software manufacturers. Supposedly, the Russian app Max randomly switches on the camera (can't find a citation for that now), so you can use that as an example of how far it could go.
- camera mostly offline unless something is happening
- recording time is usually short and focused on that thing happening right now, not everywhere
- the point of view is usually close to ground, aka less things to capture
- mostly if not always is done with a human carrying it, so you are aware of that recording
- not connected to any analytical AI software that fingerprints everything passing by
Flock:
- cameras are always online
- recording is always on 24/7 and on a wide angle
- usually at high elevation so it exposes more (like a swimming pool in your house)
- stealthy compared to a human holding a cam, just another pole in the street.
- and most importantly, that differentiate flock from even other CCTV let alone smartphones, is the network and the AI analysis that are also directly connected to law enforcement who happen to abuse it.
So yeah it’s not it even close, if you see some stranger standing next to your house for few hours let alone with a smartphone recording your house and pool, sure hell you will report them or go and confront them, not the case with flock.
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